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BY LORETTA J. MESTER
Is the Personal Bankruptcy System
Bankrupt?
ver the past few years, several attempts
have been made to reform the U.S.
bankruptcy system, to help stem perceived
abuses of the system. In this article,
Loretta Mester outlines the components of reform
proposals. She then looks at the empirical research
on bankruptcy to evaluate the rationale for
reforming the system and the effectiveness of
proposed changes.
Neither a borrower nor a lender be;
For loan oft loses both itself and friend,
And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.
Polonius
Act 1, Scene 3
Hamlet by William Shakespeare
Over the past several years,
Congress has attempted to pass
legislation to resolve perceived problems
in the personal bankruptcy system in
the U.S. Although it has not proposed
anything as drastic as Polonius
recommended, Congress has proposed
several significant changes to the






bills were passed in the House (HR 333)
and in the Senate (S 420) in March
2001, but Congress adjourned before
reconciliation of the bills could be
completed. Legislation is again being
considered this year, but regardless of
the outcome, the debate about the
U.S. personal bankruptcy system is
unlikely to be resolved anytime soon.
Indeed, a number of studies provide
evidence on the rationale for changing
the current system, on whether reform
is necessary, and on whether the
proposed revisions will have the
intended effect.
After reviewing the current
personal bankruptcy system and the
proposed changes, we￿ll discuss some
of the findings of these recent studies.
These studies do shed some light on the
debate and cast some doubt that the
proposed changes will yield benefits
as significant as intended. They also
suggest further research is necessary




As Joseph Pomykala discusses
in his interesting article, the word
￿bankruptcy￿ has two roots. ￿Banca
rotta￿ is Latin for broken board. In
medieval Italy, ￿creditors would
break the workbenches of defaulting
merchants over the merchants￿ heads.￿
￿Banqueroute￿ is French for debtors
on the lam (route), as bankruptcy
was considered an act of debtor
fraud. As Pomykala points out, before
the mid-18th century, bankruptcy was
considered a crime, and in England,
certain bankrupt debtors were subject
to capital punishment. The U.S.
modified English law to be less harsh.
For example, the Pennsylvania
Bankruptcy Act of 1785 allowed for
those convicted of bankruptcy to be
flogged while nailed by the ear to a
pillory, after which the ear would be
cut off. (Of course, how much more
lenient this was is clearly debatable.)
Bankruptcy protection has
been part of U.S. federal law since 1898.
Indeed, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution authorizes Congress to
enact ￿uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies￿ (see the article by
Leonidas Mecham). The structure of
the current bankruptcy system was
established in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. The idea is to allow a ￿fresh
start￿ (within limits) for honest people
who, often through unfortunate
circumstances beyond their control,
have gotten into trouble with debt and
to allow for creditors to be repaid in
an orderly fashion with the debtor￿s
available assets.32   Q1 2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
The bankruptcy provisions
allow for a sharing of risk between
borrowers and creditors, offering some
insurance to borrowers if they find
themselves unable to repay their debts.
The insurance gives consumers whose
income may be low today but is
expected to rise in the future the
confidence to borrow now to pay for
consumption. This raises consumers￿
economic well-being. If things go as
planned, they will repay their debts.
If some adverse event, like a job loss,
prevents them from repaying, they
can file for bankruptcy and protect
their future income from creditors.
Bankruptcy procedures better enable
consumers to smooth their consumption
over time, thereby increasing economic
efficiency. The bankruptcy system also
provides a joint debt-collection system
for a debtor￿s creditors (see the CBO
study for a nice review of personal
bankruptcy fundamentals). A
bankruptcy system that is too harsh
would lower economic welfare by
discouraging borrowing and risk sharing.
However, a system that is too lenient
and allows debtors to escape from
their commitments too easily can hurt
economic efficiency by causing creditors
to restrict the supply of credit and raise
its cost to creditworthy borrowers.
The federal bankruptcy courts
administer the bankruptcy system. All
bankruptcy cases are filed in these
federal courts. There are 94 bankruptcy
districts in the U.S. and its territories,
each with a court. Pennsylvania is
broken into three districts: eastern,
central, and western, while New Jersey
and Delaware are each separate and
single districts. The courts in all three
states (along with the District of the
Virgin Islands) are part of the third
federal circuit. A bankruptcy case is
often overseen by a court-appointed
trustee.
Under current law, individuals
considering bankruptcy can file
under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of
the bankruptcy act.1 Chapter 7,
sometimes called straight bankruptcy,
is liquidation ￿ a filer hands over his
assets (with some exemptions) to the
trustee, who then sells the assets and
uses the proceeds to repay the debtor￿s
creditors. The remaining debts (with
some exceptions) are then discharged
￿ that is, wiped clean ￿ and the
debtor retains control of his or her
future income.2 In many cases there
are few assets available to repay
creditors, and most unsecured debt,
such as credit card debt, is not repaid
in bankruptcy (see the CBO study).
In other cases, a debtor may want to
keep control of an asset, like a car,
that is pledged as collateral against
a loan. In this case, the debtor can
￿reaffirm￿ the debt ￿ the debtor and
creditor agree that the debtor will pay
the creditor all or part of the debt,
even though the debtor has filed for
bankruptcy, and the creditor will not
repossess the property. A person can file
for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 every
six years.
Chapter 13 involves adjustment
of debts of an individual with regular
income. Under this chapter, some debts
are reduced, but then debtors and
creditors devise a plan by which the
debtors repay their remaining obligations
out of their future incomes. Repayment
is made in installments over a three-
year period (which the court can
extend to five years). The debtor must
repay creditors at least as much as they
would have received under Chapter 7,
and claims entitled to priority must be
paid in full. The debtor cannot take
on any new debt without the trustee￿s
approval, and the debtor￿s secured
and unsecured debt must be less than
certain specified limits to allow him
or her to file under Chapter 13. In
exchange, debtors retain more of their
assets than they would under Chapter
7. At the end of the repayment
period, any remaining unpaid debt is
discharged. Generally, someone can
file for bankruptcy under Chapter 13
as often as he or she wants (except
that, in some cases, the filing cannot
be within 180 days of dismissal of a
previous case).
As part of the filing under
either chapter, the debtor submits a list
of his assets, income, liabilities, creditors,
and debts. After a debtor files under
either chapter, an automatic stay stops
creditors from collecting on unpaid
debts. This prohibits creditors from
filing lawsuits against the debtor for
repayment, trying to garner the debtor￿s
wages, or making telephone calls
demanding repayment (see Under-
standing the Federal Courts).
WHY THE CALL TO REFORM?
Bankruptcy protection is
designed to help people get out from
under the burden of excessive debt and
to get a fresh start. Some people, though,
point to abuses of the system: Debtors
who actually have the ability to repay
sometimes escape their obligations.
Knowing this escape route exists may
give borrowers an incentive to take on
more debt, to the extent that lenders are
willing to supply them credit. Of course,
lenders should respond to a lenient
bankruptcy law that permits many
debts to be discharged by restricting
credit or raising the cost of credit so that
only the better credit risks could borrow.
A bankruptcy system that is too
1 They may also file under Chapter 11, but
this is rare. Chapter 12, which is similar to
Chapter 13, applies only to family farmers
in financial distress. See Report 106-49 on
S. 625, U.S. Senate, and Mecham for fuller
descriptions of the U.S. personal bankruptcy
system.
2 According to Mecham, 18 categories of
debt cannot be discharged under Chapter 11;
there are fewer restrictions under Chapter 13.
Certain types of tax claims, debts for spousal
or child support or alimony, and debts for
willful and malicious injuries to person or
property are examples of nondischargeable
debts.   Business Review  Q1 2002   33 www.phil.frb.org
lenient would lead to economic
inefficiencies whereby the supply of
credit was too restricted and its cost
too high.
Over the years, changes have
been made to the system to try to limit
the scope for abuse. For example, in
1984, judges were permitted to dismiss
Chapter 7 cases if they thought granting
relief would constitute a ￿substantial
abuse￿ of the bankruptcy code. But
the term ￿substantial abuse￿ was not
defined, and creditors and trustees were
not allowed to present evidence to the
judge in a particular case on whether
relief should be viewed as substantial
abuse (see Report 106-49, Senate).
Filings Have Increased in
Recent Years. One factor pointed out
in the most recent round of legislative
consideration of the bankruptcy system
was the substantial increase in the
number of filings that began in the
1980s. Total bankruptcy filings,
including personal and business filings,
hit a record 1.43 million in the year
ended June 1998, and they have been
very high since then, with 1.39 million
filings in the year ended June 2001
(Figure 1).3 Indeed, the 400,000 filings
in the second quarter of 2001 was the
most ever for a three-month period.
Over 97 percent of these filings are
personal as opposed to business, and 70
percent of personal filings per year are
typically Chapter 7 filings (Figure 2).4
FIGURE 1
Annual Number of Bankruptcy Filings
(12-month periods ending in June)
FIGURE 2
Number of Personal Bankruptcy Filings,
Total and by Chapter
(12-month periods ending in June)
Note: Shaded areas represent economic recessions.
Source: Bankruptcy data from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
3 The number of personal filings before
and after 1979 are not directly comparable
because the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
allowed for spouses to file a joint petition for
bankruptcy protection. See the CBO study
for further discussion.
4 Note that some of the personal filings
could actually represent business failures
because some small businesses are funded
by the personal credit lines of their owners.
See Appendix A of the CBO study for
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Chapter 7 Personal Filings
Chapter 13 Personal Filings
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.34   Q1 2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
Figure 3 shows the number of personal
bankruptcies per thousand households
(the bankruptcy rate) in the three
states in the Third Federal Reserve
District (Delaware, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania) and in the U.S.5 As
you can see, these numbers ranged
between nine and 13 bankruptcies
per 1000 households in 2001. In other
words, in 2001, 0.9 to 1.3 percent of
households filed for bankruptcy in the
nation and in our three states. (Note
that there is much wider variation in
the personal bankruptcy rate across
the other states in the U.S. In 2001,
Tennessee, which had 24.5 filings per
thousand households, had the highest
rate; Iowa, which had 4.1 filings per
thousand households, had the lowest
rate. See the Table.)
The number of personal
bankruptcy filings began accelerating
in the 1980s, with an especially
large increase between 1995-98.6
For example, from 1961 to 1980, the
personal bankruptcy rate rose, on
average, about 3 percent per year.
Since 1980, the average increase in
the personal bankruptcy rate has been
almost 8 percent per year, with an
especially sharp increase of 14 percent
per year between 1995 and 1998 (Figure
4). We can look at the increase another
way: In 1980, there was one personal
bankruptcy filing for every 336 house-
holds in the U.S.; in 2001, there was
one personal bankruptcy filing for every
78 households.
Some of the rise in bank-
ruptcies in the 1980s can be attributed to
bad economic times: There was a short
recession from January 1980 to July
FIGURE 3
Personal Bankruptcy Rate, Total and by Chapter
(12-month periods ending in June)
FIGURE 4
Personal Bankruptcy Rate and
Growth in Personal Bankruptcy Rate
(12-month periods ending in June)
Note: Sum of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 does not equal total because there are a few
personal business filings under Chapter 11. Personal bankruptcy rate is the number of
personal bankruptcy filings per thousand households.
Sources: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and U.S. Census.
Note: Shaded areas represent economic recessions.
Personal bankruptcy rate is number of personal filings per year per 1000 households.
Sources: Bankruptcy data from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; household
data from the Bureau of Census, www.census.gov.
5 Delaware has about 300,000 households,
New Jersey about 3.1 million households,
Pennsylvania about 4.8 million households,
and the U.S. about 106 million households.
6 In contrast, business filings, which
increased in the early 1980s, fell back in
the latter half of the 1980s and in the 1990s.   Business Review  Q1 2002   35 www.phil.frb.org
1980 and a long one from July 1981 to
November 1982 (recessions are shown
by shaded bars in the figures). But the
rapid rise in the bankruptcy rate in the
1990s is more difficult to understand,
since this was a period of very good
economic conditions ￿ economic
growth averaged 3.2 percent per year
in the 1990s, and the unemployment rate
had fallen to 4 percent by the end of the
decade. Even this is not unprecedented:
The rate of bankruptcy filings rose
rapidly in the mid-1980s in the midst
of an economic expansion, and it has
risen in other periods of economic
expansion as well. (Note that the rise
is not necessarily a bad thing, as it
accompanied an increase in credit
availability to households.)
Households did increase their
borrowing in the 1990s, and the rise in
household debt-service burdens ￿ that
is, required payments on mortgages
and other consumer debt as a percentage
of disposable income ￿ in that decade
may explain part of the rise in the
bankruptcy rate (Figure 5, see next
page). Yet the debt-service burden was
at comparable levels in the mid-1980s,
and the bankruptcy rate was much
lower.7 So factors other than debt-
service burdens appear to play some
role in the decision to file.
The most recent increase in
filings in the first half of 2001 might
be the result of pending legislation
to change the bankruptcy system, as
people contemplating bankruptcy may
have accelerated their filings to get in
under the old rules. Still, the fact that
the bankruptcy rate rose in the late
1990s during good economic times and
remains high is taken by many as an
indication that the system is being
abused by people who actually have
TABLE
Personal Bankruptcy Rate by State in
Year Ended June 2001
(Number of Personal Bankruptcies per 1000)
Personal
Total No. of Bankruptcy Rate
Nonbusiness Households (Nonbus. Filings
State Filings (2000 Census) per 1000 Hhs)
Tennessee 54,730  2,232,905 24.51
Utah  16,915  701,281 24.12
Georgia  63,800  3,006,369 21.22
Nevada  15,833  751,165 21.08
Alabama  36,116  1,737,080 20.79
Mississippi  20,561  1,046,434 19.65
Arkansas  19,466  1,042,696 18.67
Indiana  42,537 2,336,306 18.21
Maryland  32,956  1,980,859 16.64
Idaho  7,578  469,645 16.14
Oklahoma  20,892  1,342,283 15.56
Washington  34,087  2,271,398 15.01
Louisiana  24,730  1,656,053 14.93
Kentucky  23,609  1,590,647 14.84
Oregon  19,667  1,333,723 14.75
Illinois  66,817  4,591,779 14.55
Virginia  38,361  2,699,173 14.21
Ohio  61,906  4,445,773 13.92
West Virginia 9,630 736,481 13.08
New Jersey 39,575 3,064,645 12.91
Missouri  27,989  2,194,594 12.75
California  143,174  11,502,870 12.45
Florida  78,702  6,337,929 12.42
Wyoming  2,343  193,608 12.10
Kansas  12,554  1,037,891 12.10
Hawaii  4,712  403,240 11.69
Arizona  22,036  1,901,327 11.59
Rhode Island 4,690  408,424 11.48
New Mexico 7,420  677,971 10.94
Michigan  41,251  3,785,661 10.90
Colorado  16,921  1,658,238 10.20
Pennsylvania  47,708  4,777,003 9.99
Montana  3,578  358,667 9.98
Washington, DC 2,410 248,338 9.70
North Carolina 30,215  3,132,013 9.65
Nebraska  6,382  666,184 9.58
Wisconsin  19,624  2,084,544 9.41
Delaware  2,730  298,736 9.14
New York  63,642  7,056,860 9.02
Texas  66,290  7,393,354 8.97
Connecticut  11,144  1,301,670 8.56
South Carolina 12,868 1,533,854 8.39
Maine  4,198  518,200 8.10
Minnesota  15,216  1,895,127 8.03
North Dakota 2,021  257,152 7.86
South Dakota 2,228  290,245 7.68
New Hampshire 3,545  474,606 7.47
Massachusetts 16,676  2,443,580 6.82
Vermont  1,580  240,634 6.57
Alaska  1,361  221,600 6.14
Iowa  9,662  2,336,306 4.14
7 There have been periods ￿ for example,
between 1988 and 1991 ￿ when debt-service
burden and filings moved in opposite
directions.36   Q1 2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
the wherewithal to repay their debts.
This view has led many observers to
believe that the bankruptcy system
needs to be revamped and has led
to proposed legislation to change
the system. Whether changes to the
bankruptcy system will have much of
an effect on the rate of filings depends
both on what changes will be enacted
and whether the bankruptcy system
itself has encouraged filings.
BANKRUPTCY REFORM
LEGISLATION
Although there have been
many attempts to pass legislation over
the past several years, bankruptcy
reform legislation has yet to be signed
into law. In March 2001, the House
and Senate passed their own versions of
bankruptcy reform legislation (HR 333
and S 420); similar bills were passed the
previous year by the 106th Congress,
and hearings were held in 1997 by the
105th Congress. Last year, Congress
adjourned before reconciliation of the
bills could be completed, but bankruptcy
reform legislation is again being
considered this year. While the
versions passed by the House and the
Senate in 2001 differed in some ways,
those differences have narrowed as
legislation has worked its way through
several sessions of Congress. In last
year￿s bills, there was general agreement
on basic aspects of reform. Here I￿ll
review eight proposed changes to
the bankruptcy system. The first five
of these reforms favor creditors by
limiting the benefits to debtors from
declaring bankruptcy. The last three
reforms might be considered debtor
protections.
(1) Chapter 7 Means
Testing. The bankruptcy system would
be changed to what proponents of the
bills call a ￿needs-based￿ system. If a
debtor has sufficient income to repay a
large part of his or her debts, he or she
could not pursue Chapter 7 liquidation
but only a Chapter 13 repayment plan.
A means test would be applied to
determine which debtors would be
forced into Chapter 13 and how much
debt would have to be repaid over a
five-year period. Debate has centered
on whether means testing is necessary.
Creditors favor such testing, saying
that some debtors have abused the
current bankruptcy system. Consumer
groups say only 3 percent to 5 percent
of Chapter 7 filers would have to
repay some of their debt under the
proposed means tests, and they argue
that reform is not necessary, since the
rate of filings dropped in 1999 after
the record rate in 1998. As discussed
below, arguments for and against
means testing are in dispute.
The 2001 bills barred Chapter
7 filing if, after living expenses and
the cost of other necessities, the debtor
could afford to repay at least $100 per
month over a five-year period. The
bills generally used the standards the
IRS uses to figure out living expenses
for people owing back taxes, but the
bill specified the use of actual costs of
other necessities (for example, child
care, union dues, and so forth). Some
income, such as Social Security and
war crimes compensation, would be
excluded from the calculations. Those
earning less than the median income
in the applicable state would qualify
for Chapter 7 regardless of their ability
to repay.
Under current law, if a debtor
files under Chapter 13, the repayment
period is three years unless the court, for
cause, extends it to a maximum of five
years. This provision would remain the
same for debtors whose family income is
less than the median family income in
the applicable state. However, for
families with higher income (who
would be forced to file under Chapter
13 by the means test), the repayment
plan would be extended to five years.
FIGURE 5
Personal Bankruptcy Rate and
Debt-Service Burden
Note: Shaded areas represent economic recessions.
Source: Bankruptcy data from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts; debt-service
burden data from the Federal Reserve Board. Debt-service burden is household required
payments on mortgage and consumer debt as a percentage of disposable personal income.
Quarterly personal bankruptcy rate is quarterly filings per thousand households. Note,
 sum of quarterly filings equal annual filings. Correlation between debt-service burden
and quarterly personal bankruptcy rate was 0.84 from 1980 to 1987, ￿0.71 from 1988 to
1991, and 0.88 from 1992 to 2000.   Business Review  Q1 2002   37 www.phil.frb.org
(2) Nondischargeable
Debts. Bankruptcy courts currently
presume that if a debtor bought more
than $1000 in luxury goods or services
or took $1000 in cash advances in
an open-ended credit plan within 60
days before filing for bankruptcy, these
debts were fraudulently incurred,
and so they are not dischargeable.
Any debt incurred to pay an existing
nondischargeable debt is non-
dischargeable if it was incurred with
the intent of not repaying. Non-
dischargeable debts include certain
taxes, family support obligations, and
debts arising from fraud. The proposed
legislation would make more debts
nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
The 2001 bills extend the
definition of fraudulently incurred
(and, therefore, nondischargeable)
debt. In the House bill, the threshold for
presumption of fraudulent purchases of
luxury goods was lowered to $250 within
90 days of filing for bankruptcy, and the
threshold for cash advances was lowered
to $750 within 70 days of filing. The
Senate bill agreed with the House,
except that the threshold for luxury
goods was lowered to only $750.
(3) Homestead Exemption.
Many states allow a debtor to keep
possession of his or her residence (up to
some limit) when filing for bankruptcy;
the residence would not be available to
pay off creditors. Five states (Florida,
Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, and
Texas) put no limit on the exemption
for a primary residence; other states
are quite restrictive (for example,
New Jersey allows no homestead
exemption).8 One of the major
differences between the House
and Senate bills passed last year was
their treatment of the homestead
exemption. The Senate version would
put a federal cap of $125,000 on the
exemption for a primary residence.
This cap would apply to all states.
The House bill maintained states￿
ability to opt out of the federal limit
and reestablish an unlimited or other
exemption by passing legislation.9
Both bills lengthened the time from
six months to two years that a debtor
must live in a state before being able to
claim that state￿s exemption.
(4) Lien Strip-Down.
Currently, debts are secured only to
the value of the collateral, with any
remainder treated as unsecured debt.
Thus, a debtor could pay the amount
of the collateral￿s current market value
and keep the collateral ￿ this is a strip-
down. For example, a debtor could
purchase a car, file for bankruptcy, and
keep the car by paying off the value of
the car, even though this is less than the
amount he contracted to pay in the
loan. Debtors who bought furniture,
which has little resale value, are able to
keep the furniture by repaying the low
resale price rather than paying off the
much larger debt. Consumer groups
argue that changing the rules to allow
creditors to repossess the collateral
would force reaffirmations, wherein
debtors agree to pay certain debts and
not discharge them in bankruptcy. The
2001 legislation sought to limit strip-
downs. The House bill barred strip-
downs for a motor vehicle acquired by
the debtor within five years prior to filing
bankruptcy and for other personal
property bought within one year prior to
filing. The Senate bill differed from the
House bill in setting the period for motor
vehicles at three years prior to filing.
(5) Repeat Filings. Currently,
debtors can file for Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy at any time (except, in some
cases, within 180 days of a prior
dismissal). Debtors can file for Chapter
7 bankruptcy six years after a discharge
in bankruptcy. The legislation would
have limited repeat filings. Both bills
would have barred a Chapter 7 filing
within eight years of prior discharge.
The Senate bill would have barred a
Chapter 13 discharge within three years
of a prior discharge under a Chapter 7,
11, or 12 filing, and within two years of
a prior discharge under Chapter 13. The
House bill was harsher, disallowing a
Chapter 13 discharge within five years
of any prior discharge.
(6) Reaffirmation of Debts.
Consumer advocates say creditors are
pressuring debtors into reaffirming debts
￿ in other words, pressuring them into
saying that they will pay the debt and
not discharge it in bankruptcy. Such
reaffirmations are supposed to be filed
with and approved by the bankruptcy
court. But Sears was recently held
liable in a class action based on
reaffirmations of debt that were not
filed with bankruptcy courts. The case
involved Sears￿ pressuring debtors into
reaffirming their debts with Sears
rather then having them discharged in
bankruptcy. Sears admitted to criminal
fraud and paid a fine of $60 million.
The bills passed in 2001
sought to stem abusive reaffirmation
agreements by mandating that certain
specific disclosures be made in writing
to the debtor, explaining the terms
of the underlying credit agreement
and the reaffirmation. The bills
asked the attorney general to
8 These data are as of January 1, 2000. See
footnote 13, page 490 of Report 107-3, House
of Representatives.
9 Prior to 1978, there was no federal
exemption; the states controlled exemptions.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 set
federal exemptions for certain assets,
including personal goods, tools of trade,
autos, and homesteads. But individual states
were allowed to opt out and set their own
limits, and by 1983, all of them had. The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 raised the
federal exemption level and tied it to the
Consumer Price Index starting in 1998. As
of January 1, 2000, the federal exemption was
$16,150 per debtor; 35 states had set their
own exemption levels and did not allow the
federal exemption; and the remaining states
allowed debtors to choose between their state
exemption or the federal exemption when filing
for bankruptcy. See footnote 13, page 490 of
Report 107-3 Part 1, House of Representatives
and the study by Jon Nelson.38   Q1 2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
10 Adverse selection in the credit-card market
has also been documented in my paper with
Paul Calem. The fact that credit-card rates
are very sticky and don￿t tend to come down
when other rates do is partly attributable to
this adverse selection problem.
enforce prohibitions against abusive
reaffirmations.
(7) Consumer Credit
Disclosures. Some argue that creditors
have led consumers into bankruptcy by
misleading them about the true cost of
credit. The legislation sought to make
credit card companies disclose more
about the consequences to the borrower
of making only the minimum monthly
payment.
The bills would have amended
the Truth-in-Lending Act to require
disclosures on credit-card bills. Credit
card issuers would have had to provide
generic examples of the consequences
of making only minimum payments on
bills in terms of how long it would take
to pay off the debt. Issuers also would
have had to give a toll-free number
where holders could get specific
information about repayment scenarios
for their own accounts. Enhanced
disclosures for home-equity loans,
introductory loan rates, and late
payment deadlines and penalties
would have been required. Both bills
would have barred the termination of
a credit card just because a customer
hadn￿t incurred a finance charge.
In testimony before the
House in March 1999, Federal Reserve
Governor Edward Gramlich said the
Board of Governors wondered whether
repeated disclosures to consumers might
create ￿information overload.￿ He said
the Board does not generally favor
laws that restrict a creditor￿s discretion
to determine which accounts or
transactions it deems as economically
viable. The Board￿s view is that if
creditors are terminating accounts of
customers who use their credit cards
only for transactions purposes, they are
doing so because they consider these
accounts unprofitable.
(8) Credit Counseling.
Provisions are included to address
the issue of unsophisticated borrowers.
These provisions are intended to ensure
that the debtor made a good-faith effort
to negotiate a repayment plan with
his creditors on his own. However, the
requirement might also delay filings
until debtors are unable to come up
 with a repayment plan in Chapter 13.
Both bills required the debtor to have
undergone credit counseling within 180
days before filing under Chapter 7 or
Chapter 13.
As suggested by this overview,
while the House and Senate bills passed
in 2001 differed in some of their details,
there was general agreement on major
items of reform. The real question is
whether these reforms are necessary
and, if so, whether they will be effective.
EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO
BANKRUPTCY REFORM
There have been several
studies of personal bankruptcy. The
implications of the empirical work to
date is mixed as to whether the proposed
bankruptcy reform is needed and
whether it will have the intended effect.
Partly at issue is the extent to which
borrowers respond to the incentives
provided by the bankruptcy law ￿
borrowing more than they otherwise
would and declaring bankruptcy even
though they could eventually repay their
debts ￿ or, alternatively, whether they
declare bankruptcy when they face an
unexpected hardship that makes it
impossible for them to repay their debts.
There are four main issues.
First, I￿ll discuss empirical evidence
on the source of the recent rise in
bankruptcies and the extent to which
market forces place limitations on the
number of bankruptcies. If these forces
are effective, reforms are less needed.
Similarly, I￿ll discuss empirical
evidence on the relationship between
social forces (stigma) and the number
of bankruptcy filings. A lessening in
the effectiveness of these social forces
would help support arguments for
reform. Next I￿ll discuss evidence
on the extent to which the current
bankruptcy system is being abused.
High levels of abuse favor the
reformers. Finally, I￿ll discuss evidence
concerning the efficacy of proposed
reforms. Even if one believes the
current system needs reform, it is not
clear that the proposals will yield the
desired effect.
(1) Market Forces. In a study
done in 2000, Lawrence Ausubel argued
that market forces have tempered some
of the recent acceleration in personal
bankruptcy filings and that legislation
is unnecessary. As the bankruptcy
rate increased, lenders responded by
tightening their credit standards, thus
leading to the decrease in the number
of bankruptcies between 1998 and 1999.
In Ausubel￿s view, if there ever was a
￿bankruptcy crisis,￿ it is self-correcting.
In congressional testimony in
1998, Ausubel argued against the means-
test approach because, in his view, the
immediate cause of the record number
of bankruptcies is the high level of
household debt, which he attributes in
part to aggressive lending tactics. In a
1999 study, Ausubel found that in
randomized trials on preapproved credit-
card solicitations conducted by a major
U.S. issuer of credit cards, offers that
included higher interest rates and fees
tended to attract riskier borrowers with
higher delinquency, charge-off, and
bankruptcy rates than offers with better
terms. In other words, issuers face a
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Ausubel places some of the blame for
higher bankruptcies on the creditors
who have issued the debt. He favors
the approach of earlier proposed
legislation that would restrict the
claims of lenders who caused a debtor￿s
ratio of unsecured debt to income to
exceed 40 percent. He also favors a
time priority in bankruptcy: unsecured
lenders would be repaid in the order
in which they lent, with the earliest
lender repaid first and the latest
lender repaid last, giving the later
lenders more incentive to monitor
the borrower￿s credit position.
Joanna Stavins reviewed
studies that have shown riskier borrowers
have gotten better access to credit-
card loans over time, noting that the
rise in credit-card borrowing in the
mid-1990s has coincided with the
increase in bankruptcy filings. Using
data from the Terms of Credit Card
Plans, a survey of about 200 of the
largest bank credit-card issuers
conducted twice a year by the Federal
Reserve Board, Stavins provided
empirical evidence that credit-card
issuers that offer higher rates and
fees in order to compensate for higher
risk do tend to experience higher
delinquency rates (measured by the
fraction of outstanding credit-card
loans 60 days or more overdue), a
finding similar to Ausubel￿s. But unlike
Ausubel, Stavins found that these
issuers did not seem to have higher
charge-off rates (the fraction of
outstanding credit card loans that
are written off). Indeed, her empirical
results showed that banks that charged
higher rates and fees earned higher net
income from credit cards than banks
that charged lower fees. This implies
that at least over the period covered
(1990-99), when the economy was in
good shape, it was profitable for issuers
to extend credit to riskier borrowers.
Whether that would continue to be
true in an economic downturn remains
to be seen.
The relationship between
debt levels and bankruptcies is more
complicated than the studies by
Ausubel and Stavins might suggest.
There is no doubt a strong correlation
between debt burdens (measured by
the debt-to-income ratio, debt-to-
assets ratio, or debt-service burden)
and number of bankruptcies, since a
higher debt burden means a negative
shock can have a more severe effect
on a household. However, we also
know that in the aggregate, debt and
debt-to-assets seem to increase after
households see their incomes rise and
expect their future incomes to rise.
Debt seems to facilitate growth rather
than inhibit it. Debt levels have
been expanding not only because of
aggressive lending but also because of
the expanding economy and because
technological advances have allowed
creditors to offer loans to more
borrowers at a lower cost (see my
1997 article on credit scoring).
(2) Stigma. Another factor
that may have contributed to the
increase in the bankruptcy rate is
the decreased social stigma associated
with declaring bankruptcy. Certainly,
bankruptcy continues to have a
negative connotation. It can harm a
person￿s reputation, and it can make it
more difficult to gain access to credit
in the future. Federal law allows
credit bureaus to continue to report
a bankruptcy filing in the person￿s
credit report for up to 10 years after
the filing. A study by David Musto
showed that this does restrict the
person￿s access to credit. His work
using credit-file data from 1994-97
showed that when the bankruptcy flag
was removed from the report, the more
creditworthy past filers initiated new
credit relationships, especially high-
limit credit cards, at a much faster rate
than normal ￿ evidence that the flag
was a constraint on their getting
credit.11 Nevertheless, some of the
negative effects from filing may have
declined over time. Filing for
bankruptcy may be more accepted
these days, since it has become more
common. There are other costs
associated with filing that may have
fallen as the number of filings has
risen. For example, it is easier to find
information on how to file (the forms
and the information are readily
available on the Internet); more
people have experienced bankruptcy,
so there are more people who can give
advice; and there are more bankruptcy
lawyers competing for business.
In an interesting study, David
Gross and Nicholas Souleles assembled
a panel of over 25,000 individual
credit-card accounts, chosen to be
representative of all open accounts in
June 1995. They studied the behavior
of these accounts for the next 24
months or until they first defaulted
Another factor that may have contributed to
the increase in the bankruptcy rate is the
decreased social stigma associated with
declaring bankruptcy.
11 Similarly, Stavins presented some data  from
the Survey of Consumer Finances for 1998
indicating that among those who have ever filed
for bankruptcy (8.51 percent of respondents),
the average level of credit-card debt is largest
for those who filed nine or more years ago. But
she also found that the average credit-card debt
for someone who filed one or two years ago was
higher than for those who filed three to nine
years ago. Stavins posited that this might be
because once someone files under Chapter 7,
he or she cannot file again for six years, so
issuers might feel relatively safe lending in the
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or were closed in good standing, in
an attempt to see whether the recent
increase in bankruptcies is better
explained by supply effects or demand
effects. That is, did lenders increase
the supply of credit to less credit-
worthy borrowers, who account for
the increase in bankruptcy filings?
Or, even after researchers control for
creditworthiness, have people become
more willing to default over time?
Has their demand for bankruptcy
increased? According to Gross and
Souleles￿ estimates, riskier borrowers
￿ for example, those with lower credit
scores, larger credit card balances, and
smaller monthly payments ￿ are
much more likely to default. Default
rates were also higher for people living
in states where unemployment was
higher, house prices were lower, and
fewer residents had health insurance.12
The authors documented that
there was an increase in credit to riskier
borrowers. But increases in credit limits
and other changes in risk-composition
explain only a small part of the
significant increase in default rates
between 1995 and 1997. They found
that all accounts, even those with the
same risk characteristics, age, and other
economic fundamentals, became more
likely to default over the sample period.
And this increase in the probability of
bankruptcy ￿ about 0.06 percentage
point per month between the start of
the sample period in June 1995 to its
end in June 1997 ￿ is comparable to
that which would occur if the credit
score of every account in the sample
were reduced by one standard deviation,
which would be a very large increase
in the overall riskiness of the sample.
While not conclusive, this evidence
is consistent with the stigma
hypothesis, that is, that a decline in
the cost of declaring bankruptcy ￿
either the social, legal, or information-
gathering costs ￿ is largely responsible
for the increased level of filings.13
(3) Abuse. A basic premise
of bankruptcy reform legislation is that
the current system is being abused by
people who declare bankruptcy when
they can still afford to repay their
debts. Here the evidence is very
mixed, and the results depend on
the various assumptions made about
the type of means test that would be
enacted and the way different types of
debt would be handled. A 1997 study
by John Barron and Michael Staten
published by the Credit Research
Center at Georgetown University
estimated that if all secured debt
was reaffirmed, about 32 percent
of Chapter 7 debtors in their sample
could repay about 31 percent of their
nonhousing, nonpriority debts. This
would be an average payment per filing
of $3570 over five years. The study
was based on a sample of 3798 families
who filed for bankruptcy in 13 major
U.S. cities during the spring and
summer of 1996. It was not a
nationally representative sample,
and a review by the General
Accounting Office disputed some
of the study￿s findings on a number
of methodological grounds. For one
thing, the study used the information
debtors provided at the time of filing
about their income, expenses, and
debts without verification and assumed
that the filer￿s ratio of income to
expenses remained constant over
the five-year repayment period.
Visa and MasterCard have
funded several studies, including three
by Ernst &Young (by Tom Neubig and
co-authors). The latest of these
studies, published in March 1999 and
based on a nationally representative
sample of 1997 filings, estimated that
10 percent of Chapter 7 debtors would
be affected by a means test for ability
to pay either 25 percent or more of
unsecured debts or $5000 over five
years. This would yield $3 billion in
debt recovery over five years. But
these results assumed that the debtors
remained in payment plans for the
full five years and that their incomes
rose as fast as their expenses and debt
(Report 106-49, Senate, p. 88).
Marianne Culhane and
Michaela White got significantly
different results from the Ernst & Young
studies. Their results were based on a
different sample of bankruptcy filings
(from 1995) and different assumptions
about, among other things, how long
Increases in credit
limits and other changes
in risk-composition
explain only a small




12 Gross and Souleles also documented
a seasoning effect: They found that the
probability of delinquency rises from the
time the account is opened until it is about
two years old, then the probability falls.
13 There is a debate in the legal literature
about whether an economic modeling
approach or a sociological approach is
the appropriate methodology for studying
bankruptcy decisions, especially when  stigma
is the factor being investigated (see Michelle
White￿s 1997 article for an interesting
discussion). The economic modeling approach,
favored, for example, by White (1997), assumes
that consumers act to maximize their welfare
and, therefore, may act strategically when it
comes to filing for bankruptcy, as we￿ll discuss
below. The sociological approach, favored, for
example, by Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren,
and Jay Westbrook (1989) and Rafael Efrat
(1998), assumes that people file for bankruptcy
when their financial problems become severe
enough that they can no longer handle their
debt; it is not something they anticipate or
plan for, and they do not act strategically
regarding filing for bankruptcy. My training
puts me in the economic modeling camp;
hence, the studies I review here largely
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debtors remain in their payment plans
and debtors￿ automobile expenses.
They estimated that 3.6 percent of
Chapter 7 debtors could afford to
repay some of their debts, with total
recoveries of $450 million over five
years. Because of their different sample,
even when Culhane and White
changed their assumptions to those
used by Ernst &Young, they still
estimated significantly lower recoveries
￿ $930 million ￿ than Ernst & Young.
One of the drawbacks of
many of these types of studies is that
they assume lender behavior would
remain the same after bankruptcy
reform. But if lenders lend even more
aggressively, the number (and cost)
of bankruptcies might increase after
reform. The studies also assume that
borrower behavior would remain the
same, but models suggest that this
need not be the case.14
For example, one potential
drawback of the means test as proposed
in the legislation is that shifting
debtors with incomes above a certain
threshold from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13
essentially imposes a high tax on future
earnings, since Chapter 13 requires
debtors to use some portion of their
future earnings to repay their debt.
Michelle White￿s 1999 study pointed
out that this sets up perverse incentives,
reducing debtors￿ willingness to work
and even giving them an incentive to
quit their jobs to avoid the tax. She
and Hung-Jen Wang have proposed
combining Chapters 7 and 13 so
that debtors filing for bankruptcy
would have to use their assets and
their future earnings, after certain
exemptions, to repay their debts. Their
simulations suggest that this system
would not have deleterious effects on
debtors￿ incentives to work.
 Wenli Li also developed a
general equilibrium model of bank-
ruptcy chapter choice and showed that
individuals with fewer assets but higher
income were more likely to choose
Chapter 7, while those with more
assets and lower income were more
likely to choose Chapter 13 and they
work less.15 The author￿s theoretical
analysis of proposed reforms indicated
they will affect borrowers differently,
depending on their level of wealth and
income. For example, a means test that
shifts filers into Chapter 13 would hurt
the ones with few assets and medium
income levels. Anticipating this, those
filers with a higher probability of
filing for Chapter 13 will reduce their
borrowing but also not work as hard.
This has important implications for
trying to assess the economic benefits
of bankruptcy reform or the amount
of debt that borrowers would be able
to repay in Chapter 13.
Strategic behavior. A corollary
of the premise that people are abusing
the bankruptcy system by filing when
they can repay is that people act
strategically when filing for bankruptcy.
But the empirical evidence on just how
strategically people are behaving when
they file is mixed. ￿Forum shopping￿ is
one strategy. The exemption levels for
personal bankruptcy vary widely across
states. For example, as discussed earlier,
a single filer receives no exemption for
a home in New Jersey but an unlimited
exemption in Texas. So there is an
economic incentive to move to a
state with a higher exemption before
declaring bankruptcy.
In their provocative 1999
study, Ronel Elul and Narayanan
Subramanian, using data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), estimated that about 3 percent
of all moves to states with higher
exemptions are driven by bankruptcy
considerations. This percentage doubles
for moves made by households ￿at
risk￿ for bankruptcy (that is, with
an estimated probability of filing for
bankruptcy equal to the average filer).
Using data from the University
of Michigan￿s Panel Study on Income
Dynamics (PSID) for 1984-1995, Scott
Fay, Erik Hurst, and Michelle White
found evidence that borrowers respond
to the incentives to file for bankruptcy.
They measured these benefits as the
amount of debt that is dischargeable
under bankruptcy less any assets over
the exemption level, which would
have to be given up under bankruptcy.
The authors found that for each $1000
increase in benefits, the probability of
a household￿s filing rises, on average,
by 0.021 percentage point, which would
imply a 7 percent increase in filings per
year.16 To see what this effect means,
A corollary of the premise that people are
abusing the bankruptcy system by filing when
they can repay is that people act strategically
when filing for bankruptcy.
14 In addition, these studies do not account
for the administrative expenses of imposing a
means test.
15 In an empirical study, Ian Domowitz and
Robert Sartain found that Chapter 13 filers
more often tend to be married and employed
and have higher income and higher equity-to-
debt ratios than Chapter 7 filers.
16 One drawback of the study is that only 254
households included in the PSID had filed
for bankruptcy. The rate of filings in the PSID
was only half of the national rate, suggesting
that PSID households underreported their
bankruptcy filings. See Fay, Hurst, and White
and the CBO study for further discussion of
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consider that there were about
580,000 personal filings in the year
ended June 1989, about the middle
point of the period covered in the
study. A 7 percent increase in filings
would have meant 40,000 more filings
in 1989. If the size of the effect were
the same in 2001, an increase of $1000
in benefits would have added 94,000
filings to the 1.35 million personal
filings in 2001.
Culhane and White also
studied strategies and found that
sophisticated debtors could avoid
being classified as having the ability to
repay under a means test by taking on
more debt or increasing charitable
contributions. Note that if such strategic
behavior is the rule, then estimates of
cost savings under means testing that
do not account for these reactions will
be overstated.
Other studies reviewed by
Michelle White (1998b) did not find
that personal bankruptcy rates are
significantly related to the incentives
to file.17 Indeed, the real conundrum
might not be why the bankruptcy rate
increased so much in the 1990s, but
why it didn￿t increase more18 and why
more people haven￿t moved to Texas
and Florida where the homestead
exemption is unlimited. Two reasons
suggested by White (1998a) include
the fact that sometimes creditors do
not take legal action against borrowers
who default, so borrowers have less
incentive to file for bankruptcy
protection, and that borrowers may
want to preserve the option to file in
the future, so they refrain from filing
immediately. Another possibility is that
there is indeed stigma associated with
filing, which deters households from
declaring bankruptcy.
(4) Efficacy of Repayment
Plans. The reform proposals assume
that Chapter 13 repayment plans
work. But a 1994 study by the
Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts found that 36 percent of
debtors who voluntarily entered
Chapter 13 repayment plans between
1980 and 1988 completed their plans.
The study did not indicate why 64
percent of the plans failed. Only 14
percent of all Chapter 13 cases were
converted to Chapter 7. This finding
on the efficacy of repayment plans
is important and contrary to the
assumption in many of the studies that
found that bankruptcy reform would
lead to significant cost savings, since
the studies assume that debtors remain
in the repayment plans the full five
years.
SUMMARY
Congress continues to try
to pass legislation to reform the
bankruptcy system. While the rate of
bankruptcy filings has risen over the
past several years, the reason for that
increase is still debatable and that
means the rationale for reform is
debatable too. Some proponents of
reform argue that people with the
wherewithal to repay their debts are
taking advantage of the system and
that significant cost savings would be
forthcoming from reform. Others
argue that the real reason bankruptcies
have increased is that the level of debt
has increased, perhaps because lenders
have encouraged risky borrowers to
take on excess levels of debt.
The empirical work on
the causes and incentives to file for
bankruptcy and whether the proposed
bankruptcy reform will have the
desired effect is decidedly mixed.
While this means that proponents on
each side in the debate can find the
ammunition they need by choosing the
right study, it also means that more
research is necessary in order to fully
understand the bankruptcy
phenomenon.  B R
17 White (1998b) and ￿Notes￿ review the
literature on whether debtors behave
strategically regarding bankruptcy decisions.
See also the CBO study.
18 Fay, Hurst, and White found that about 18
percent of households would have benefitted
from filing for bankruptcy over the 1984-94
period, and White (1998a) found that 15
percent of households would have benefitted
from filing in 1992. Yet, on average, fewer than
1 percent of households filed over these periods.   Business Review  Q1 2002   43 www.phil.frb.org
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